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ABSTRACT 
 
Ideology Among Independent Voter Groups (April 2007) 
 
Meagan Berry 
Department of Political Science 
Texas A&M University 
 
Fellows Advisor: Dr. Dave Peterson, Associate Professor 
Department of Political Science 
 
Not all independent voters are the same. Some independents lean toward a political party 
and are therefore called “independent leaners.” The objective here is to uncover what 
forces cause independent leaners to retain some level of partisanship by leaning. I 
hypothesize that independent leaners tend to have a stronger political ideology which 
causes them to lean back toward a party. Through analysis of the data from the 2004 
Annenberg National Election Survey, I conclude that an independent’s level of 
ideological consistency does influence whether they will be an independent leaner. It is 
also noted that other factors such as social identities and issues preferences can increase 
the influence of ideology. Furthermore, candidate preferences can reduce the influence 
of ideology. In conclusion, the hypothesis that ideology influences independents to lean 
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is upheld, but with the caveat that the strength of the influence is conditional on what 
other factors are included in the model. 
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INTRODUCTION1
It is well noted within the discipline of political science that the number of 
people who identify themselves as independent voters has increased. For political 
scientists, it is critical that we study this phenomenon to find its origins and to identify 
the behaviors that accompany it. Furthermore, we need to gain a better understanding of 
the relationship between political independence and ideology. Not all independent voters 
are the same. Some independents lean toward a political party and are therefore called 
“independent leaners.” The quest to explain the behavior of independent leaners is a two 
part mission. In order to understand the motivations of leaners, one must first find an 
explanation for why they identify themselves as independents rather than partisans. After 
all, they have clearly chosen political independence over partisanship. Next, one must 
find out why these independents then choose to lean toward a political party after they 
have renounced partisanship. There seem to be two forces at work, a centripetal force 
which pulls some people away from the partisan masses, and a centrifugal force which 
pulls them back toward the ends of the partisan spectrum. It is that second, centrifugal 
force, which this work attempts to identify. 
                                                 
1 This thesis follows the style and format of the American Political Science Association. 
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The Keith “Closet Partisan” Theory 
 In The Myth of the Independent Voter, Bruce Keith et al. put forward their 
hypothesis that there has been no true growth in the number of independent voters 
(Keith, Magleby, Nelson, Orr, Westlye, and Wolfinger 1992). First, they divide all 
voters into seven groups: Strong Democrats, Weak Democrats, Independent Democrats, 
Pure Independents, Independent Republicans, Weak Republicans, and Strong 
Republicans. They claim that, although the number of self-described independent voters 
has increased, those independents who lean toward one party over another are “closet 
Democrats and Republicans” who act as partisans, not as independents, despite their lack 
of a party title. The authors point to key differences between independent leaners and 
pure independents that support their theory. They found that pure independents tend to 
be the most apathetic and uninvolved of all voter groups, as well as the least educated. 
Independent leaners however, tend to have involvement and education rates more like 
those of weak partisans. In some circumstances, Keith et al. found independent leaners 
to exhibit stronger partisan behavior than weak partisans (Keith et al. 1992). 
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Question and Hypothesis 
 The research question in this paper takes another look at the “closet partisan” 
theory. Using the same categories of partisanship as Keith et al., my primary goal is to 
gain a better understanding of what makes people choose to be independent leaners. I 
offer some explanation as to why people choose to be independents in the background 
literature, however political independence is taken as a given in my analysis. 
What motivates independent leaners to claim independence and to hold onto a 
party preference? I hypothesize that independents leaning toward a certain party are not 
actually more partisan than pure independents, as Keith et al. claim. Instead, I propose 
that these voters only seem more partisan, because they are pulled back toward the ends 
of the voting spectrum by a stronger ideological constraint. 
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BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
Before launching into my research on independent leaners, it is necessary to offer 
a review of the existing literature. Unfortunately, when it comes to independent voters 
and ideology, there is little consensus within the discipline. The following is an attempt 
to review the relevant literature concerning ideology, partisanship, political 
independence, and the relationships between them. 
Ideology in the General Electorate 
The initial studies examining ideological behavior in the nineteen fifties and 
sixties, including The American Voter, concluded that ideology was not a strong force in 
voting behavior, and that the general voting public was unaware of ideological concerns 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1976; Converse 1964). In the nineteen 
seventies and eighties, studies, such as that of Nie and Anderson in 1974, showed that 
the influence of ideology appeared to have increased. However, some studies since then, 
such as Sullivan et al. in 1978, have indicated that the visible increase in ideology shown 
by later studies may have been due to changes in methodology rather than a true increase 
in ideological voting. The implication of these studies is that the reported change in 
levels of ideology reflects methodology improvements within the discipline to detect 
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ideological behavior. Logically, one could conclude that there may have been more 
ideological behavior in the nineteen fifties than the studies at the time were able to 
accurately capture (Sullivan, Pierson, and Markus 1978). Furthermore, a study by Arthur 
H. Miller and Warren E. Miller found that, with the increased educational levels since 
the 1950s, the amount of the population that views politics in ideological terms has 
increased (1976). In Classics in Voting Behavior, Niemi and Weisberg conclude that 
there is a “reasonably sophisticated electorate… neither super-sophisticated nor 
abysmally ignorant” (1993, 50). Therefore, one can conclude that ideological constraint 
is not a strong force for all voters, but that it may be an influencing factor for some. 
Partisanship and its Decline 
In The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-1996, Martin P. Wattenberg 
notes that there are different definitions of “partisanship,” depending on the researcher’s 
intent. He also notes that partisanship has historically been a good predictor of voting 
behavior. According to Wattenberg, partisanship reflects “a generalized standing 
decision on the part of the citizen to vote for a particular party under normal 
circumstances” (1998, 7-8). Partisanship can also be described as a psychological 
attachment or “identification,” such as it is in The Voter Decides and The American 
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Voter. In these works, partisanship serves as an “orientation” or “perceptual screen” that 
guides people politically (Wattenberg 1998). Donald Green et al. propose a related 
theory that partisanship is a social group identity, similar to an individual’s religious or 
ethnic identity. However, they do not find evidence that this partisan social identity 
causes individuals to screen out undesirable information. Rather, they posit that 
differences that are generally seen as perceptual screening may actually be the result of 
evaluations that are based on different values. In Green’s model, partisanship is formed 
based on how individuals feel about the images and social groups associated with each 
party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002). Another theory, in works by Morris P. 
Fiorina as well as by Charles Franklin and John Jackson, suggests that voters choose a 
party based on their past and expected future experiences with each party. In this theory, 
voters use partisanship as “a running scorecard of the performance of the two parties” 
(Wattenberg 1998, 14-15). Furthermore, Wattenberg notes Herbert Weisberg’s theory 
that partisanship gauges “separate attitudes toward the Democratic and Republican 
parties, political independence, and political parties in general” (1998, 15). For the 
purposes of my research, I examine partisanship as a psychological attachment or 
identification. 
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The decline of partisanship has been seen in several ways. First, split-ticket 
voting between presidential and congressional elections has increased since the 1950s. 
Studies have also shown that public opinion tends to favor vote choice based on 
individual candidates rather than party-line voting. From these factors, Wattenberg 
argues that partisanship has declined in its “ability to structure the vote” (1998, 23). 
Secondly, the number of people who identify themselves as partisans has declined. 
Wattenberg notes that Philip Converse labeled the years 1952-1964 as the “steady state” 
of partisanship, in which identification was relatively stable. According to Wattenberg, 
the decline of partisan identification began around 1964. He claims that the decline 
occurred from 1964-1972 and then stabilized at a new, lower level. 
 Wattenberg mentions the general view by Campbell and others that independents 
are the least informed and least reliable voting group. However, Wattenberg argues that 
the parties have become less “salient” to the public, causing people to become 
“indifferent” to both major parties. He further argues that an independent political 
identification could be as stable as a partisan one, which he says is confirmed by a 1980 
panel study. To further test the stability of partisanship, Wattenberg examines 
thermometer measures of opinion regarding the parties. The results showed that attitudes 
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toward the parties were not more stable than attitudes toward candidates. Therefore, 
Wattenberg argues that partisan identification may be stable because “it involves a 
process of self-labeling,” regardless of whether these labels credibly reflect attitudes 
toward the political parties. He says that “the responses are far more stable than the 
underlying attitudes that the supposedly represent” (Wattenberg 1998, 33). Wattenberg 
ultimately concludes that, partisan identification may be stable, but that it means less to 
people than it used to (1998). 
Green and his co-authors in Partisan Hearts and Minds also make an 
examination of partisan stability. They emphasize the importance of measuring the drift 
of partisanship in the electorate as a whole over time as well as the position of 
individuals within the distribution. Their key objective is to determine to what extent 
individuals oscillate around a “long-term average” partisan identity (Green et al. 2002, 
54-55). From their examination of individual level data, Green et al. determine that 
people to change their partisanship slightly in response to political fluctuations, but that 
these changes are usually short lived. They also conclude that shifts resulting in true 
realignments are rare and occur slowly. Using panel data, Green et al. found that 
individuals can move slowly within the partisan distribution, but that “people tend to 
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move in unison, if they move at all” (2002, 69). They also claim that studies based on 
simple correlations between partisan identity responses tend to exaggerate the actual 
amount of variation because of measurement error (Green et al. 2002). 
One of the most commonly mentioned rationales for voters to become 
independents is what Wattenberg calls the “dissatisfaction hypothesis.” Upon 
examination of this theory, he finds that the perception of differences between the parties 
are relatively consistent, refuting the claim that voters are dissatisfied because they see 
no difference between the two major parties. Wattenberg also found that the number of 
people who believe that one party will perform better than the other has declined. 
Wattenberg hypothesizes that fewer respondents believe a specific party will be more 
likely to solve their issue because the relevance of parties has declined for them in 
general. In another test, he did not find consistent growth in negative opinion, but did 
find a decline in strong partisans and an increase in neutral opinions. Furthermore, he 
found that these trends were present even in the “steady state period” of 1952-1964, 
before partisan identification began to decline (Wattenberg 1998, 62). These findings 
support his evaluation that the dissatisfaction hypothesis is not largely responsible for 
the increase in independents. 
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 In order to explain why partisanship has declined, Wattenberg considers V. O. 
Key’s echo chamber theory from The Responsible Electorate. The argument behind the 
theory is that voters simply respond, or echo back, their opinion based on the options 
given to them. According to this theory, the public does not demand change, but simply 
responds to changes it sees occurring. Wattenberg believes that people have come to 
view political parties as less relevant (and people have become more neutral toward the 
parties) because the parties themselves have not worked to maintain their relevance as 
political institutions. He further argues that reduced partisan action by political 
leadership and changes in media coverage have had a role in decreasing party saliency 
(Wattenberg 1998). 
It is generally agreed upon that the American two-party system is not likely to 
collapse any time soon, but that there are some problems associated with weak 
partisanship. Wattenberg specifically mentions a few of them: increased difficulty in 
forming “comprehensive programs” based on compromise, increased extremism 
“leading to a deep political cleavage,” “the development of strident single-issue groups,” 
increased negativity in politics, reliance on the presidency to fill gaps left by the parties 
(to build policies), and increased political volatility (1998, 128-130). Wattenberg 
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concludes that “As the long-term forces that serve to anchor electoral behavior decline, 
the potential increases for large oscillations in the vote because of short-term issue and 
candidate factors” (1998, 131).  
The most relevant aspect of Wattenberg’s research for my project is that 
partisanship means less to people than it used to. Therefore, some other factor must be 
filling in for its influence. Specific issue interests, candidates, interest groups and 
ideological constraint all seem to be likely choices. Furthermore, Key’s echo chamber 
theory suggests that voters may be conditioned to pay more attention to these other 
factors and less to political parties. Another possibility may lie in Green et al.’s 
discussion of cohort replacement’s role in partisan realignments. Unfortunately, they 
only discuss increased political independence as a transitional period during the regional 
realignment in the South (Green et al. 2002). They do not cite cohort replacement as a 
possible cause of the increasing number of independent voters (likely because they do 
not discuss this phenomenon in detail), however cohort replacement could be a viable 
driver of political independence if it can be determined that younger generations are 
more favorably disposed to being independents. In short, a voter’s cohort and view of 
political independence could be factors that effect one’s partisanship, or lack thereof. 
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Therefore, my project to determine what separates independent leaners from pure 
independents, must center around a quest to determine which factor or factors are at 
work: ideological constraint (as I hypothesize), special issue interests, candidates, or the 
images of social groups and the parties themselves. 
Partisanship and Political Independence  
 In “Political Independence in America, Part II: Towards a Theory,” Jack Dennis 
identifies four “dominant rationales” that explain why people may become political 
independents. These rationales, or “attitude clusters,” are “anti-partyism”, “political 
autonomy”, “partisan neutrality”, and “partisan variability” (Dennis 1988, 218-219). 
“Anti-partyism” is largely self explanatory. Similar to what Wattenberg’s dissatisfaction 
hypothesis, this attitude cluster reflects negative feelings about the specific parties, or a 
feeling that parties in general are inefficient institutions. Dennis describes “political 
autonomy” as “identification with some positive ideals of being politically independent” 
(1988, 202). This encompasses the idea that one should remain politically independent in 
order to make sound, unbiased choices that are good for society. “Partisan neutrality” is 
an attitude that there are no real differences between the two major parties. One who 
holds this idea becomes an independent because they don’t see a clear choice to be 
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made. Dennis defines “partisan variability” as “a self-perceived lack of consistency of 
political thought and behavior” (1988, 205). One who holds this rationale may be 
remembering times in the past where they have deviated from partisan voting. Dennis 
concludes that these categories are separate, yet are also somewhat related to each other. 
He found that partisans may hold these attitudes at some level as well. As one would 
expect, these independence attitudes were found to be stronger among pure independents 
than among independent leaners (Dennis 1988).  
Some of Dennis’s independence attitude groups may have connections to 
ideological constraint (and by extension to my hypothesis). Dennis did not argue that 
ideology is part of the political autonomy dimension, but it seems logical that this group 
may be especially driven by ideology as part of how they make their decisions about 
what is in society’s best interest. Partisan variability may also be driven by ideology if it 
is the basis for why people split tickets or bolt from the party line. However, this 
variability may be due to ambivalence as well. As for the partisan neutrals, it does not 
seem likely that they would be ideological since they do not see a distinction between 
the parties (which obviously have ideological differences). The anti-partyism category is 
probably not related to ideological constraint either, since it is driven by dislike of the 
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parties, not necessarily dislike of what they stand for. The relationship between these 
independence attitudes and ideological influence remains to be tested. 
In another article by Dennis, “Political Independence in America, Part I: On 
Being an Independent Partisan Supporter,” the general argument is that the view of 
independents as politically uninvolved in The American Voter is incorrect, because the 
people who best fit this description do not consider themselves “unattached” rather than 
being partisans or independents. Dennis found that Independent Partisan Supporters 
(similar to Keith et al.’s independent leaners), for both parties, are the highest in 
involvement, and the Unattached are the lowest in involvement, with Ordinary Partisans 
and Ordinary Independents in the middle. This supports a picture of independents that is 
different from that of The American Voter. He says, “Overall we find this pattern 
repeated whatever indicators of political involvement are chosen – whether we are 
looking at particular items that are either attitudinal or behavioral in focus, or at more 
general measures of political involvement” (Dennis 1988, 97). Once again Dennis does 
not directly relate these findings to an ideological constraint. However, if Independent 
Partisan Supporters are more politically involved than Ordinary Partisans and Ordinary 
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Independents, it seems reasonable that this could be due to a higher ideological 
constraint. 
Dennis compares what he calls the “Traditional Partisan Index”, or “TPI”, to a 
new scale he has created, called the “Partisan Supporter Typology series,” or “PST.” The 
TPI is the traditional seven point partisanship scale (used by Keith et al.). The PST is 
different, because it allows for the fact that partisanship and independence may be 
distinct identities that do not run on a continuum. With the PST, it is “possible for 
respondents to be both party supporters and Independents” [his emphasis] (Dennis 1988, 
85). He mentions that Keith et al.’s “closet partisans” are lumped into the general 
category of Independent with the TPI. He further adds that there may be “closet non-
partisans” who feel that they have to choose a party even though they don’t strongly 
identify with one. The PST adds more emphasis to the idea of partisanship by asking 
whether respondents consider themselves supporters of a party, rather partisans in 
general. Naturally, fewer people will be coded as partisan supporters with the PST than 
the TPI. Dennis also found that both types of the TPI leaners were generally “Ordinary 
Independents” in the PST format (1988). This evidence provides some support for my 
hypothesis that Keith et al.’s leaners are independents, not closet partisans, because they 
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do differentiate themselves by claiming independence above a party. Dennis also 
examined the PST and TPI groups compared to their responses to the seven point liberal-
conservative ideological self-identification question. Consistent, with he previous 
findings, he found that Independent Partisan Supporters were the most likely to give 
themselves an ideological label. This evidence provides obvious support for my 
hypothesis. Dennis argues that the “shades and varieties of Independents” should be 
examined “given the empirically emergent bi-dimensionality of partisanship and 
independence” (1988, 100). 
In “Understanding Party Identification: A Social Identity Approach,” Steven 
Greene argues that social identity theory can be applied to political partisanship in order 
to explain how people view themselves politically as partisans, independents, or 
independents who lean toward a party. According to Greene, “Social identity theory 
holds that individuals attempt to maximize differences between in-group and out-
group…” and that as a result people will have an exaggerated perception of the 
differences between groups than what may objectively be true (1999, 393-394). This is 
similar to Converse’s “screening effect,” discussed earlier in the “Partisanship and It’s 
Decline” section of this paper. Greene states that partisanship has declined in the U.S. 
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because people do not socially identify with parties as much as they used to. He also 
argues that “some citizens may also socially identify with the category of political 
independents” (Greene 1999, 395). Greene goes on to say that a person may have more 
than one political social identity, therefore allowing them to identify themselves as an 
independent while exhibiting partisan behavior. This is similar to the argument Dennis 
makes that there are two separate dimensions of partisanship: general partisanship and 
independence. Greene found that “leaners were statistically indistinguishable from weak 
partisans in their partisan social identity” (1999, 399). Furthermore, the data suggested 
that there was some level of independent social identity occurring. Greene noted that 
because he didn’t find a significant difference in social identity between weak partisans 
and independent leaners, that he supported Keith’s argument that independent leaners 
are partisans, not true independents. However, he went on to note that “apparently this 
partisan identity is not strong enough to outweigh an independent social identity when 
they categorize themselves,” thus separating them from weak partisans (Greene 1999, 
402). In conclusion, Greene suggests that people may have more than one political social 
identity. Furthermore, having multiple social identities may bring about a situation in 
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which a person perceives themselves as an independent, yet acts as a partisan (Greene 
1999). 
Greene’s evidence that people can socially identify as independents lends some 
credence to my argument that people are not closet partisans, and are instead people who 
see themselves as independents, but act upon ideology, which is viewed by others as 
partisan behavior. It also makes sense that a person might perceive both parties to be 
extreme out-groups and see themselves as a moderate member of an independent in-
group, thus causing them to be an independent, despite the fact that they may still have a 
partisan ideology. However, the article only supports my argument that ideology causes 
independents to act like partisans if it can be established that ideology contributes to a 
partisan social identity. 
From the works summarized above, it is obvious that there are many different 
theories on the nature of ideology, partisanship, and political independence in the 
electorate. While some of these ideas do not support my hypothesis, there seems to be 
enough supporting literature out there to encourage and guide my efforts. This research 
will hopefully lead to a better understanding of the relationship between ideology and 
political independence. Although this is only a small facet of voting behavior, I believe 
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that it is an important contribution to the understanding of independent voters, making 
important to the discipline as a whole. 
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METHODOLOGY 
 The data in this study is taken from National Annenberg Election Study 
conducted to analyze the dynamics leading up to the 2004 presidential election (Romer, 
Kenski, Winneg, Adasiewicz, and Jamieson 2006). This data set is ideal, because it has 
over 80,000 total respondents and asks a wide variety of demographic, sociological, 
issue preference, candidate-related questions. The large number of respondents allows 
one to select a small sub-population of the respondents (such as pure independents and 
independent leaners) yet still have a large enough pool of respondents to conduct 
significant analysis. Once all non-independent voters are eliminated from the dataset, 
over 21,000 self-identified independent voters still remain. 
In order to examine the relationship (or lack thereof) between various factors and 
the tendency of an independent to lean toward a party I will utilize binary logistic 
regression analysis. The first step to regressing the variables is to create a usable 
measure of an independent’s tendency to lean toward a political party. The particular 
party a leaner chooses is irrelevant to this analysis; the key object is whether or not the 
person leans at all. To do this I recoded the survey variable for partisanship to score a 1 
for any independent that leaned and a 0 for all other independents. 
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Testing the Hypothesis 
In order to test the relationship between ideological constraint and independent 
leaning, it was first necessary to create an index to measure ideological constraint. This 
index is composed of a basket of special issue questions that have clearly identifiable 
liberal and/or conservative answers. First, I designated which responses for each 
question would be considered liberal or conservative (all opposing or supporting answers 
were coded the same regardless of whether the respondent “strongly” held that opinion 
or only “somewhat” held that opinion). Next, I created a “C score” or “Conservatism 
Score” to count the number of conservative answers given within the group of questions 
and an “L score” or “Liberalism Score” to count the number of liberal responses. Once 
these scores were created, the resulting numbers were inserted into the following 
formula: 
Ideological Consistency = -1(C+L)/2 – |C – L|  
(adapted from Thompson, Zanna, and Griffin 1995). This score can be regressed against 
the respondent’s tendency to lean in order to test the hypothesis that strong ideological 
constraint influences independents to lean toward a political party. 
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Testing Other Theories 
In addition to testing my hypothesis, I decided to test some other factors that 
could be causing independents to lean. I ran a regression of ideological consistency 
along with issue preferences and social identities together against independents’ 
tendency to lean. The goal in this analysis is to see if there is any empirical support for 
these other rationales, and if so, whether the evidence is stronger or weaker than it is for 
my hypothesis. 
 Another logical factor that could cause an independent to lean would be a strong 
opinion on a special interest issue. These are the same issues that were used to build the 
ideological consistency index (banning all abortions, banning partial birth abortions, 
environmental protections, trade agreements, gun control, federal marriage amendment, 
homosexual civil unions, military spending, government health insurance, income 
redistribution, balanced budget, federal budget deficit, and funding for stem cell 
research). The respondents’ C scores and L scores (the same ones used to develop the 
ideological consistency score) were used as an aggregate measure of the respondents’ 
issue preferences. These scores allowed me to test how an independent’s conservative or 
liberal opinions on common issues may impact their tendency to lean. 
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According to Green et al.’s theory in Partisan Hearts and Minds, social group 
identities and their relationship to the parties can influence partisanship (2002). Green’s 
theory applies to partisanship in general, but I am extending it to independents and 
testing whether is might cause an independent to lean. The social identities tested were: 
race, gender, social class, religion, union membership, and sexuality. I recoded each of 
the social identities into a binary variable. I then ran the respondents various social group 
identities against the leaning variable. 
In his works, The Decline of American Political Parties and The Rise of 
Candidate-Centered Politics, Wattenberg builds his theory that candidates have become 
more influential as the relevance of political parties has declined (Wattenberg 1998). As 
an extension of this theory, I tested whether or not a candidate could influence and 
independent voter to lean toward a political party. As measures of opinion about the two 
presidential candidates in 2004, I used the feeling thermometer measures reported by the 
survey in two ways. First, I created a measure that I called candidate 1, which is the 1 to 
10 measure of the candidate the respondent liked best. This represents the strength of 
their preference for their favored candidate. My other measure, candidate 2, evaluates 
the difference in opinions held about the two candidates, by taking the difference 
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between the two candidate feeling thermometer scores. The two measures, candidate 1 
and candidate 2, are each run individually and then with the ideological consistency 
variable against independents’ tendency to lean. 
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RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
After performing the regression of my hypothesis variable for ideological 
consistency (IdeolConsist2) against independents’ tendency to lean, I found that it had a 
coefficient of .062 which was statistically significant at the .05 level (see Appendix for 
the full regression output table). This suggests that there is a positive relationship 
between ideological constraint and leaning, which will make independents more likely to 
lean as they become more ideologically consistent. The mean value of IdeolConsist2 is -
.09961. When this is plugged into the formula for converting coefficients from logistic 
regressions into predicted probabilities, this makes the average probability of being a 
leaner .7556, or 75.56%. The range of scores for ideological consistency is -4 to 4. When 
the highest and lowest values are plugged into the probability formula (which adjusts 
based on the regression output), there is a difference of .091, or 9.1%, between the 
highest and lowest scorers. This means that there is a 9.1% higher probability among 
independents of being a leaner if you have an ideological consistency score of 4 as 
opposed to -4. These results support my hypothesis that independents with higher levels 
of ideological constraint are in fact more likely to be leaners. 
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The regression of ideological consistency, issue preferences, and social identities 
against independents’ tendency to lean produced a coefficient for ideological 
consistency (IdeolConsist2) of .0997, which was statistically significant at the .05 level 
(see Appendix for the full regression output table). The C score had a coefficient of 
.0852, which was statistically significant as well. However, all of the other variables in 
the model (the L score, race, gender, religion, union membership, and sexuality) were 
not statistically significant at the .05 level. The L score, gender, and religion become 
significant at the .1 level, but the other variables fail to be significant at any standard 
level. The coefficient for ideological consistency is larger in this model than in my 
hypothesized model. Furthermore, the average probability of being a leaner (based on 
the average value of ideological consistency), 78.13%, is greater in this model. The 
difference between the highest and lowest scorers becomes .1354, or 13.54% greater 
probability of leaning in this model. Therefore, the probability of being an independent 
leaner increases when issue preferences and social identity variables are added into the 
model, and the impact of the ideological consistency measure increases. 
The two measures of opinion about candidates, regressed separately, both 
produced statistically significant coefficients at the .05 level (see Appendix for the full 
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regression output table). The coefficients were .1464 and .1237 respectively. This 
suggests that the measure of which candidate an independent prefers most has a greater 
impact than the measure of the difference between the two. The range of both measures 
runs from 0 to 10 (because the thermometer measures they are derived from run 0 to 10). 
The average probability of being a leaner was approximately the same between the two 
measures (around 77%). As with the previous regressions, I plugged the highest and 
lowest scores into the probability formula to determine the difference in probability 
between the ends of the scale. The differences were 29.33% and 20.40% respectively. 
This implies that the range of scores in candidate 1 has a greater impact on the tendency 
to lean that those of candidate 2.  
After examining the each candidate feeling measure’s relationship to an 
independent’s tendency to lean, I regressed each of the candidate variables with the 
ideological consistency measure. This is done in order to see if either of the candidate 
measures have an effect on the relationship previously seen between ideological 
consistency and leaning. All of the coefficients in these two regressions were statistically 
significant at the .05 level (see Appendix for the full regression output table). The 
coefficient for ideological consistency in this model is .063. This is roughly the same as 
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the coefficient in the model with just ideological consistency (.062). The average 
probability of being a leaner (77.44%) and the difference in probability of leaning 
between the highest and lowest ideological consistency scores (8.77%) were also very 
similar to the model original model as well. This leads me to conclude that the addition 
of the candidate 1 measure (the thermometer measure for the respondent’s preferred 
candidate) does not make a large difference in the modeled relationship between 
ideological consistency and an independent’s tendency to lean. However, it should be 
noted that the average probability and difference in probability both dropped slightly 
with the addition of the first candidate measure, suggesting that ideology becomes a little 
less important in this model. 
 The combined model of ideological consistency and candidate 2 (the difference 
in thermometer measures between the two candidates) had a much difference result from 
the previous model. Under this condition, the coefficient of ideological consistency 
became .035, a large drop from the .062 in the model of ideology alone. Furthermore, 
the average probability of leaning rose to 77.66% and the difference in probability 
between the consistency scores was reduced to 4.85%. This suggests that ideological 
continues to play a role when the second candidate measure is added, but a much smaller 
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role. The difference in opinions of the two candidates does seem to reduce the influence 
of ideological consistency in determining an independent’s tendency to be a leaner.  
Conclusions 
 From my analysis, it is clear that ideological consistency does influence whether 
or not an independent will be an independent leaner. This influence is made stronger by 
the addition of social identities and issue preferences into the model. On the contrary, the 
influence of ideological consistency is weakened when the measure of the difference 
between opinions of candidates is a factor in the model (opinion of the preferred 
candidate does not seem to play a significant role). In all, I believe that my hypothesis is 
upheld that ideology can pull independent leaners back toward the edges of the 
continuum and encourage them to be independent leaners. However, the candidate 
measure, which was not a part of my hypothesis, seems to be an influencing factor as 
well. I stick by my original proposition that independent leaners are not more partisan 
than pure independents, but concede that there are other factors besides ideological 
consistency (specifically candidate measures) that pull these voters away from the pure 
independent group. 
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 These conclusions imply that if one wants to better understand independent 
voters, one should examine factors such as ideological consistency and candidate 
opinion that can influence a pure independent to become an independent leaner. With a 
better understanding of how independents choose to lean, perhaps the discipline can 
improve predictive models of vote choice for independents. Such improvements would 
indeed be beneficial as independents continue to be an electorally influential group. 
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 APPENDIX 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
IdeolConsist2 21810 -4.00 4.00 -.0996 1.39126
C 21810 .00 8.00 1.5300 1.35870
L 21810 .00 8.00 2.4107 1.59853
Race 21810 .00 1.00 .0575 .23279
Religion 16748 .00 1.00 .5767 .49410
Sexuality 6966 .00 1.00 .0011 .03387
Union 21810 .00 1.00 .0922 .28932
Gender 21810 .00 1.00 .4948 .49998
candidate1 19895 .00 10.00 7.1974 1.99228
candidate2 19895 .00 10.00 4.2815 2.97908
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Ideological Consistency 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 IdeolConsist2 .062 .011 30.450 1 .000 1.064 
  Constant 1.135 .016 5117.432 1 .000 3.111 
 
 
Ideological Consistency, Conservatism, Liberalism, Race, Gender, Religion, Union 
Membership, and Sexuality 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 IdeolConsist2 .100 .026 14.346 1 .000 1.105 
  C .085 .026 10.519 1 .001 1.089 
  L .035 .020 2.993 1 .084 1.036 
  Race -.133 .127 1.086 1 .297 .876 
  Gender -.123 .065 3.580 1 .058 .884 
  Religion .125 .065 3.659 1 .056 1.133 
  Union .058 .113 .263 1 .608 1.060 
 Sexuality .471 1.099 .184 1 .668 1.602 
  Constant .942 .089 111.666 1 .000 2.566 
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Preferred Candidate 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 candidate1 .146 .008 308.324 1 .000 1.158
  Constant .179 .060 8.877 1 .003 1.196
 
 
Difference Between Candidates 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
 candidate2 .124 .006 417.658 1 .000 1.132
  Constant .716 .028 648.112 1 .000 2.047
 
 
Ideological Consistency and Preferred Candidate  
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
IdeolConsist2 0.063 0.012 26.465 1 0 1.065 
candidate1 0.147 0.008 309.697 1 0 1.158 
 
Constant 0.182 0.06 9.226 1 0.002 1.2 
 
 
Ideological Consistency and Difference Between Candidates 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
IdeolConsist2 0.035 0.012 7.968 1 0.005 1.035 
candidate2 0.122 0.006 402.266 1 0 1.13 
 
Constant 0.727 0.028 654.76 1 0 2.068 
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